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Myers v. United States1 is perhaps the leading Supreme Court case 
on the law of presidential power. The decision invalidated an 1872 law 
that required senatorial consent to the removal of local postmasters. 
Despite the seeming triviality of the office at issue, Myers clearly was 
a “great case.” It was argued twice in the Court, the second time with 
Senator George Wharton Pepper appearing on behalf of Congress.2 
Chief Justice Taft’s expansive opinion was not confined to the postmas-
ter issue but went on to conclude that the Constitution gives the 
President unfettered power to remove nonjudicial appointees. These 
officials exercise executive power on behalf of the President, who must 
have implicit faith in their loyalty and trustworthiness.3 This reasoning 
 
†  Associate Dean for Academic Affairs (School of Law), David L. Brennan 
Professor of Law, and Professor of Political Science, Case Western Reserve 
University. Special thanks to the staff of the Oregon Historical Society, 
who granted me access to the Frank Myers Papers. Thanks also to the 
editors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review for allowing me to 
present this Article at the symposium. Earlier versions were presented at 
the American Political Science Association annual meeting and at a 
faculty workshop at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
Thanks to participants at all of these presentations for helpful suggestions. 
All remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the author. 
1. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
2. Id. at 56.  
3. See id. at 117 (“As he is charged specifically to take care that [the laws] 
be faithfully executed, the reasonable implication . . . was that as part of 
his executive power he should select those who were to act for him under 
his direction in the execution of the laws.”). 
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led to the conclusion that the Tenure of Office Act,4 which precipitated 
the impeachment of Andrew Johnson and served as the model for the 
postmaster statute, was also unconstitutional.5 Taft reached that bigger 
issue even though the Tenure of Office Act had been repealed almost 
forty years earlier.6 
Myers initially was viewed as a sweeping endorsement of executive 
power, and in recent times its reasoning has been invoked as a vital 
precedent by adherents of the so-called unitary executive. But Myers 
has not always been so understood either by the bench or by the 
academy. The Court soon retreated from Chief Justice Taft’s broad 
language and has not embraced the full implications of the Myers 
approach despite impassioned urging by judicial and academic 
advocates of the unitary executive theory. Nearly half a century later, 
nobody involved in the Watergate tapes case, United States v. Nixon,7 
noticed that the regulation which created the position of special pros-
ecutor was inconsistent with Myers, and even Justice Scalia, the Court’s 
most outspoken proponent of the unitary executive, overlooked the 
problem in one of his most impassioned dissenting opinions. 
So Myers remains an important decision, but there are many 
perplexing aspects to it. For one thing, it has never been very clear why 
Frank Myers was removed from his position. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
has suggested that Myers might have “committed fraud in the course 
of his official duties” but cited no authority for this suspicion.8 If Myers 
had been engaged in illegal or unethical activities, however, the 
administration almost certainly could have obtained the necessary 
senatorial consent to his ouster. That raises questions about why 
President Wilson transformed what appears to have been a minor 
personnel matter into a constitutional confrontation. In addition, Taft’s 
majority opinion in Myers went well beyond what was necessary to 
resolve the case and ignored the position advanced by the solicitor 
general in support of Wilson’s action.9 The traditional jurisprudential 
preference for narrow decisions makes the breadth of the Myers opinion 
something of an anomaly that is worthy of explanation. Finally, 
 
4. Ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867), amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1869, ch. 10, 16 
Stat. 6. 
5. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 176 (reasoning that “it . . . follows that the Tenure 
of Office Act . . . was invalid”). 
6. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500. 
7. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
8. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 827 (1997); see also William H. 
Rehnquist, Grand Inquests 262 (1992) (noting that Myers was inves-
tigated for unspecified “irregularities in the management of the Portland 
post office”). 
9. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 90 (argument of Solicitor General Beck) 
(suggesting that “[i]t is not necessary in this case to determine the full 
question as to this removal power”). 
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perceptions of the Myers ruling have fluctuated over the years, 
suggesting the need to put the case into broader context. 
This Article seeks to provide at least tentative answers to some of 
these questions. Part I outlines the facts leading to the lawsuit. Then 
Part II considers several possible explanations for why the Wilson 
administration might have forced the constitutional issue. Next, Part 
III examines Taft’s position both as Chief Justice and as President in 
order to assess the widespread suggestion that his experience in both 
offices prompted him to write so expansively. Finally, Part IV explores 
the changing view of Myers both as a precedent and as a symbol of 
presidential power. 
I. FRANK MYERS 
President Wilson appointed Frank Myers as postmaster of 
Portland, Oregon, for a four-year term in April 1913.10 Myers, then 
thirty-seven years old, had been active in Democratic politics in the 
state, most recently as an aide to U.S. Senator Harry Lane. Lane, the 
grandson of Oregon’s first territorial governor and a Columbia- 
educated physician, served as superintendent of the state mental hos-
pital, held leadership positions in the medical profession, sat on the 
state board of health, and in 1905 was elected to the first of his two 
terms as a reformist mayor of Portland.11 Myers managed Lane’s 1912 
campaign for the Senate and went to Washington to serve as his 
personal secretary before becoming postmaster.12  
10. Myers was nominated on April 15, see 50 Cong. Rec. 199 (1913), and 
confirmed and commissioned on April 24, see id. at 391; Power of the 
President to Remove Federal Officers, S. Doc. No. 69-174, at 12 
(1926). 
11. See Robert E. Burton, Democrats of Oregon 33 (1970); Gordon 
B. Dodds, The American Northwest 191–93 (1986) [hereinafter 
Dodds, American Northwest]; Gordon B. Dodds, Oregon: A 
Bicentennial History 173 (1977) [hereinafter Dodds, Oregon] (not-
ing that Lane “reformed the police department and refused to create need-
less jobs for patronage plums”). 
12. See Ex-Postmaster F.S. Myers Dies, Oregon J., Dec. 24, 1924, at 1 
(“Through the management of the campaign of former United States 
Senator Harry Lane and subsequent service as private secretary to the 
senator, Myers first became prominent in political life of the state.”); F.S. 
Myers, Ex-Postal Chief, Dies, Portland Telegram, Dec. 24, 1924, at 1 
(noting that Myers “emerged into national politics in 1912 as a member 
of the campaign committee for the late Senator Lane”); Frank S. Myers 
Is Dead, Portland Oregonian, Dec. 25, 1924, at 9 (“In 1912 [Myers] 
acted as secretary for the late Senator Lane, after having been his 
campaign manager.”). Although Lane’s election to the Senate antedated 
the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for direct 
election to the upper chamber, Oregon reformers had succeeded in 
enacting a measure under which members of the state legislature could 
commit themselves to voting for the candidate receiving the most votes 
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His appointment was greeted enthusiastically. Local newspapers 
ran prominent stories marking the new man’s arrival and noting his 
commitment to obtaining larger quarters for the overcrowded local post 
office.13 Things seem to have gone uneventfully for Myers during his 
first term. He remained involved in politics, especially in connection 
with federal patronage matters.14 Except for a minor dispute over the 
delayed seating of Oregon’s newly elected member of the Democratic 
National Committee in 1915, Myers generally managed to avoid 
controversy.15 Wilson nominated Myers for a second four-year term in 
July 1917, and the Senate confirmed two days later.16 
Myers’s second term was much more contentious than his first. In 
the spring of 1919 he became involved in yet another crisis over the 
state’s national committeeman. This time the split was more serious, 
with the state party’s executive deadlocked between factions loyal to 
President Wilson and to Senator George Chamberlain, who had been 
sharply critical of Wilson’s military preparedness policies.17 Myers 
weighed in strongly on the Wilson loyalist side and was widely rumored 
to be contemplating a primary run against Chamberlain the following 
 
in a nonbinding general election contest. See Burton, supra note 11, at 
28; Dodds, Oregon, supra note 11, at 169–70; Russell G. Hendricks, 
Election of Senator Chamberlain, The People’s Choice, 53 Or. Hist. Q. 
63, 65 (1952). 
13. New Postmaster Arrives, Oregon J., May 7, 1913, at 1; New Postmaster 
Is In Charge Today, Portland Telegram, May 7, 1913, at 2. 
14. Myers’s papers include a substantial correspondence with aspirants for 
federal appointments and many letters to both his mentor, Lane, and 
Oregon’s senior senator, George Chamberlain, about patronage matters. 
His focus was not confined to Oregon appointments. See, e.g., Letter from 
Frank S. Myers to Senator George E. Chamberlain (Aug. 1, 1913) 
(regarding appointment of James Coffey as Collector of Internal Revenue 
in South Dakota). 
15. See Letter from Frank S. Myers to Hon. A. Mitchell Palmer (Mar. 25, 
1915) (noting that “for some unknown and unexplainable reason the 
National Chairman refuses to recognize [the newly elected committee 
member]”); Letter from Frank S. Myers to Hon. Joseph Tumulty (Dec. 1, 
1915) (noting the unpopularity of the holdover committeeman in Oregon). 
Ironically, the holdover committeeman whose replacement Myers 
supported was Will R. King, who would later represent him in his lawsuit 
challenging his dismissal as postmaster. See Myers v. United States, 272 
U.S. 52, 56 (1926). 
16. See 55 Cong. Rec. 5288 (1917); id. at 5375. 
17. See Democrats in Row for State Control, Portland Oregonian, Apr. 
20, 1919, at 23; Political Row Near Crux, Portland Oregonian, May 
19, 1920, at 20; see generally Sheldon Bernard Avery, A Private Civil 
War: The Controversy Between George E. Chamberlain and Woodrow 
Wilson (June 1967) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Oregon) (on 
file with author). For further discussion of Chamberlain’s position, see 
infra notes 44–49 and accompanying text. 
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year.18 The Chamberlain faction hit back by excluding Myers from a 
private dinner held for Secretary of War Newton D. Baker.19 
Meanwhile, Myers got into a nasty public spat with Congressman 
Clifton McArthur, a Portland Republican who took to the House floor 
to denounce Myers as a “liar” for telling an interviewer that the con-
gressman had gone to Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson with a 
“crooked scheme.” Myers denied making the statements and claimed 
that the candidates he had supported against McArthur had never 
“been guilty of selling the remnant of a tubercular herd of cattle to 
Multnomah county.”20 
Later in the year, Myers asked the Post Office Department to in-
vestigate his assistant, Harry Durand. The reason for the investigation 
was not clear, although press reports suggested that Myers suspected 
Durand of harboring Republican sympathies and of personal disloyalty. 
The postal inspectors ultimately gave Durand a clean bill of health but 
then turned their attention to Myers.21 He was said to run the Portland 
post office in a high-handed, dictatorial, and manipulative fashion that 
alienated workers, customers, and all but a handful of local Democratic 
activists.22 
Within days of the first newspaper accounts of the investigation, 
Myers found himself the target of additional criticism. Portland Mayor 
George L. Baker, a Republican and staunch war hawk,23 presented  
18. See, e.g., Letter from Frank S. Myers to Hon. J.P. Tumulty (May 20, 
1919) (urging DNC to refuse to recognize the Chamberlain faction’s 
representative); Rumor Says Myers Seeks Senatorship, Portland 
Oregonian, Apr. 9, 1919, at 9; Rumored Candidacy of F.S. Myers Stirs, 
Portland Oregonian, Apr. 10, 1919, at 16; Myers Won’t Deny He May 
Seek Toga, Portland Oregonian, Apr. 23, 1919, at 13. Myers 
ultimately chose not to make the race but actively supported 
Chamberlain’s primary opponent. See Avery, supra note 17, at 92 n.19. 
19. See Chamberlain Crowd Hit Hard at Myers, Portland Oregonian, Mar. 
19, 1919, at 12 (quoting one of the dinner organizers as saying, “[t]here 
were some people we didn’t want at the dinner and so we didn’t invite 
them. . . . I might even go so far as to mention Myers”). 
20. M’Arthur Flays Frank S. Myers, Oregon J., Mar. 4, 1919, at 5; Myers’ 
Attack Resented, Portland Oregonian, Mar. 4, 1919, at 8; Myers 
Replies to Attack, Portland Oregonian, Mar. 5, 1919, at 3. 
21. See Myers Loses Fight Against Durand, Portland Oregonian, June 5, 
1919, at 4 (“It appears that there is not fault to be found with . . . Mr. 
Durand.”). 
22. See Democrats Pleased at Postal Inquiry, Portland Oregonian, July 
31, 1919, at 4 (“Hardly one person . . . has seen fit to commend the official 
administration of Mr. Myers.”); Postoffice Inquiry of Interest to All, 
Portland Oregonian, Aug. 1, 1919, at 9 (“The record of Mr. Myers is 
remarkable, according to [employees]. They say that he has caused more 
inefficiency in the local office than has ever before existed.”). 
23. See E. Kimbark MacColl, The Growth of a City 140–43 (1979). 
Mayor Baker was instrumental in forcing the resignation of a librarian 
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public charges implying that Myers was not fully supportive of U.S. 
involvement in the recently ended First World War. A number of 
returning servicemen claimed that the postmaster had refused to give 
them their old jobs, and the mayor took up their cause.24 Myers 
responded in his typically diplomatic fashion, describing Baker as “four 
flushing” and “weak minded” while strenuously denying the charges.25 
Soon the local American Legion began investigating the postmaster’s 
alleged mistreatment of World War I veterans; within a month, Myers 
backed down and restored the returnees to their prewar positions.26 
Although this flap was technically separate from the Post Office 
Department’s investigation, it certainly contributed to public percep-
tion that Myers would have to go.27 
Ultimately the Post Office Department demanded that Myers re-
sign effective January 31, 1920. The letter demanding his resignation 
explained that the previous year’s investigation had sought to 
“eliminate the antagonism which existed in the Portland office and 
bring about needed cooperation” but that this had not happened, 
leaving Washington no alternative but to remove both Myers and 
Durand.28 Myers did not go quietly, denying that he could be removed 
without the Senate’s consent and demanding a hearing on the charges 
 
who refused to buy war bonds although she claimed to support American 
participation in World War I. See id. at 149–52. 
24. See War Veterans Turn Guns on Postmaster, Portland Oregonian, 
Aug. 2, 1919, at 12 (“Failure to give ex-service men former positions in 
the Portland post-office . . . form the principal charges against Postmaster 
Frank S. Myers.”); Mayor Dares Myers to Deny Accusations, Portland 
Oregonian, Aug. 3, 1919, at 21. 
25. Mayor Baker Four Flusher, Says Myers, Oregon J., Aug. 2, 1919, at 1, 2. 
26. See Postmaster Yields to Legion’s Demand, Portland Oregonian, Aug. 
28, 1919, at 9 (noting that “Postmaster Myers will restore ex-service men 
to their former positions in the Portland postoffice” as part of his “promise 
to the employment committee of the American Legion”). Lost in the 
commotion was one important aspect of the dispute: the returning 
veterans had been assigned to night duty because, according to Myers, it 
would be inappropriate to switch the women who had been hired to 
replace them during the war off the day shift. See No Promise Given, 
Declares Myers, Oregon J., Aug. 4, 1919, at 1 (noting that Myers’s 
explanation for declining to switch the women off the day shift was due 
to “thugs and thieves” that infested Portland under the Mayor’s “rotten” 
administration). 
27. See Democrats Hoping Myers Loses Scalp, Portland Oregonian, Aug. 
17, 1919, at 19 (noting that many of those prominent in the Democratic 
Party held the opinion that “Myers is a liability rather than an asset to 
the party”). 
28. Letter from First Assistant Postmaster General J.C. Koons to Hon. F.S. 
Myers (Jan. 27, 1920) [hereinafter Myers Resignation Demand Letter], 
reprinted in S. Doc. No. 69-174, supra note 10, at 6–7. 
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against him.29 Nothing happened during the remainder of the Wilson 
administration, although he had a brief but unsuccessful meeting with 
President Harding’s Postmaster General, Will Hays, in April 1921.30 
Several days later, Myers filed suit in the U.S. Court of Claims for the 
salary he would have earned had he remained in office for the balance 
of his term.31 He lost there in 1923.32 Myers died in December 1924, but 
his widow continued the litigation in the name of his estate.33 And, as 
noted at the outset, the Supreme Court upheld the removal in 1926. 
II. WOODROW WILSON 
In removing Myers as Portland’s postmaster, the Wilson admini-
stration ignored the applicable statute, which had been on the books 
for about half a century.34 That statute provided that local postmasters 
like Myers “shall be appointed and may be removed by the President 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”35 A chief executive 
who wanted to remove a postmaster simply sent the name of a new 
nominee to the Senate; confirmation of the successor amounted to 
consent to the removal of the incumbent. President Wilson surely could 
have chosen that course to get rid of Myers, but, for whatever reason, 
he decided to defy the statute and risk a constitutional confrontation. 
In this Part, I will consider several possible explanations for bypassing 
the statute. 
 
29. See, e.g., Telegram from Frank S. Myers to Hon. A.S. Burleson (Feb. 2, 
1920), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 69-174, supra note 10, at 7; Mr. Myers 
to Take Appeal to Senate, Portland Oregonian, Feb. 5, 1920, at 11; 
Postmaster Myers Says Chamberlain Is Doing Him Injustice, Oregon J., 
Feb. 5, 1920, at 3; Myers Eager to Reply to All Charges, Portland 
Telegram, Feb. 14, 1920, at 13. 
30. See F.S. Myers, Ousted Postmaster, Given Hearing by Hays, Oregon J., 
Apr. 22, 1921, at 1; Ousted Postmaster Interviews Hays, Portland 
Oregonian, Apr. 23, 1921, at 1. 
31. See Myers Sues for Salary, Portland Oregonian, Apr. 26, 1921, at 6. 
32. Myers v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 199 (1923), aff’d, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
33. After her husband’s death, Lois Myers became an editorial writer and 
columnist for Portland newspapers. See Journal’s Original Mr. Fixit Dies 
at 80; Retired in 1949, Oregon J., Sept. 30, 1956, at A11; Mrs. Lois 
Myers, Portland Oregonian, Sept. 30, 1956, at 40. 
34. I refer to the Wilson administration rather than to President Wilson 
because the chief executive was recovering from a stroke at this time. 
Therefore, it is not entirely clear to what extent he was engaged in day-
to-day decisionmaking during this period. 
35. Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, § 6, 19 Stat. 78, 80–81. This provision was 
carried over from the Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 63, 17 Stat. 283, 292–93. 
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A. Exigent Circumstances 
If Frank Myers was engaged in criminal or unethical conduct, the 
Post Office Department would have had good reason to remove him 
from office as quickly as possible. As noted earlier, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist has said Myers was suspected of committing fraud.36 That 
seems unlikely, however. Myers was never charged with any crime. The 
letter from Washington demanding his resignation cited only personal 
conflicts within the Portland post office.37 Perhaps the postal 
authorities were more concerned with removing Myers than imprisoning 
him, but local newspapers that often reported political gossip contained 
no intimation that he was suspected of criminal wrongdoing. 
Whatever the grounds for ousting Myers, it is difficult to believe 
that the administration could not have persuaded the Senate to 
acquiesce. All the Senate had to do was confirm Wilson’s nominee to 
succeed Myers, which was the standard practice in postmaster removals 
under the statute. 
To be sure, the process might have become a bit more cumbersome 
as a result of Wilson’s 1917 extension of civil service procedures to local 
postmasterships, which previously had been handled as patronage 
appointments.38 Perhaps the new rules would have required an initial 
Senate vote agreeing with the chief executive’s desire to remove Myers 
before the necessary examination could be prepared and administered 
to potential successors. Even so, it is difficult to believe that the Senate 
would have objected to declaring a vacancy if there was good reason to 
believe that Myers had disrupted his operation as completely as the 
 
36. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
37. See Myers Resignation Demand Letter, supra note 28. 
38. See Exec. Order No. 2569A (Mar. 31, 1917). This order extended civil 
service procedures to first-, second-, and third-class postmasters, but it 
did not apply to incumbents. The Portland office was a first-class 
postmastership. Wilson’s order has been described as “almost his sole 
contribution to the extension of merit principles,” Paul P. Van Riper, 
History of the United States Civil Service 239 (1958), a surprising 
statement about a man who had been a vice-president of the National 
Civil Service Reform League before entering the White House. Id. at 230. 
President Taft had tried to extend civil service protection to incumbent 
fourth-class postmasters, see Exec. Order No. 1624 (Oct. 15, 1912), but 
Wilson quickly withdrew the protections from incumbents while providing 
that all new fourth-class postmasters would be chosen through civil 
service, see Exec. Order No. 1776 (May 7, 1913). Ironically, Myers 
opposed Wilson’s 1917 order (which did not apply to him because he was 
an incumbent) because it would adversely affect local Democratic political 
organizations; so did numerous congressional Democrats. See Letter from 
Frank S. Myers to Hon. Daniel C. Roper (Mar. 10, 1917); Civil Service 
Order Angers Congressmen, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1917, at 7; Fight Civil 
Service Order, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1917, at 5. There is no reason to 
believe that his opposition had anything to do with his later difficulties. 
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Post Office Department claimed. The likelihood of Senate approval had 
to have been even greater if, as Chief Justice Rehnquist hypothesized, 
Myers was suspected of corruption. 
Whatever the urgency of getting Myers out of the way, then, it 
cannot explain why the statutory removal procedure had to be avoided. 
At most, the exigency provided a rationale for rejecting that procedure. 
B. Democratic Factionalism 
Another possible explanation for Wilson’s decision to ignore the 
statutory removal provision was that he wanted to punish Myers for 
being aligned with his Democratic critics. Because those critics were in 
the Senate, they might have blocked an attempt to remove a postmaster 
whom one of their number had sponsored. On this reasoning, trying to 
cut the upper house out of the removal process seems like a sound 
strategy. That is an understandable hypothesis, but the available evi-
dence makes it highly implausible. 
Recall that Myers’s political mentor was Harry Lane, for whom he 
served as 1912 campaign manager and later as personal secretary.39 
Although elected as a strong supporter of Wilson, Lane opposed the 
President’s 1917 proposal to arm U.S. merchant ships. That proposal 
was blocked by a Senate filibuster at the end of the Sixty-fourth 
Congress, which led Wilson to denounce the “little group of willful men, 
representing no opinion but their own.”40 Lane also opposed the 
declaration of World War I.41 So Wilson had good reason to seek retri-
bution against someone who owed his position to Lane, but striking 
back at Myers in 1920 seems a dubious way to make the point. 
One problem with this explanation is that Harry Lane had been 
dead for almost three years when Myers was unilaterally removed from 
his position.42 It would take a remarkable political memory to wait that 
long to go after a critic’s protégé. Long memories are legion in politics, 
but in this instance the administration could have gotten rid of Myers 
much sooner. Myers’s first term as postmaster expired in 1917, just 
about the time that Lane died. Wilson could have selected someone else 
at that point. The replacement would have had to go through the new 
civil service procedures, which were announced less than a month before  
39. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
40. See Franklin L. Burdette, Filibustering in the Senate 122–23 
(Russel & Russel, Inc. 1965) (1940) (noting that Senator Lane was one of 
the eleven senators who faced severe public criticism for opposing Wilson’s 
proposal); Dodds, American Northwest, supra note 11, at 199; Ar-
thur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace 
360, 362 (1965); Thomas W. Ryley, A Little Group of Willful 
Men 32–33, 78, 119, 143–44 (1975). 
41. See Dodds, American Northwest, supra note 11, at 199; MacColl, 
supra note 23, at 137; Ryley, supra note 40, at 165. 
42. See MacColl, supra note 23, at 137; Ryley, supra note 40, at 170–71. 
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Myers’s term ended, but this complication should not have discouraged 
the replacement of an incumbent postmaster who had drawn 
administration ire. Besides, Myers was a strong Wilson supporter who 
had assisted in his 1916 reelection effort.43 
Another possibility is that Myers was forced out at the behest of 
Oregon’s other Democratic Senator, George Chamberlain. There is 
ample reason to believe that Chamberlain had no use for Myers. The 
Portland postmaster had been severely critical of the senator, so much 
so that he was rumored to be seriously considering a primary challenge 
in 1920.44 The main problem with this hypothesis is that Chamberlain 
was on terrible terms with the Wilson administration. Although (unlike 
Lane) he supported the war, Chamberlain had strongly condemned 
military inefficiency and had publicly aligned himself with Theodore 
Roosevelt and other Wilson critics on the issue.45 Worse yet, 
Chamberlain favored the Lodge reservations to the Versailles treaty, 
which by itself was likely to put him beyond the pale.46 Myers went out 
of his way to bring the Chamberlain faction’s disloyalty to the White 
House’s attention.47 Although Wilson made some overtures to mend the 
breach,48 in the end he refused to support Chamberlain for reelection in 
1920.49 Even if getting rid of Myers seemed like a small gesture of 
reconciliation before the final break came, that would not explain 
Wilson’s defiance of the statutory removal procedure. Indeed, 
challenging the Senate’s role in postmaster removals would have been 
counterproductive if the goal had been to conciliate Chamberlain by 
dismissing his nemesis. Presumably the senator would have been 
delighted to lead the fight against Myers on Capitol Hill. 
Here again, then, we can see why party considerations might have 
prompted the administration to rid itself of Myers. This cannot explain 
why the strategy included a unilateral removal in the face of the 
provision for senatorial approval. 
 
43. See, e.g., Letter from Frank S. Myers to Hon. Thos. R. Marshall (Jan. 3, 
1916) (indicating that Myers would be “very glad” to circulate political 
petitions for Wilson and his Vice President, Thomas Marshall). 
44. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
45. See Burton, supra note 11, at 42; Seward W. Livermore, Politics 
Is Adjourned 81–90 (1966); Avery, supra note 17, at 41–45, 53–54, 59–
62, 64–65, 70–84, 86–88. 
46. See Burton, supra note 11, at 42; Avery, supra note 17, at 92. 
47. See, e.g., Letter from Frank S. Myers to Hon. W. G. McAdoo (Jan. 30, 
1916); Letter from Frank S. Myers to Hon. J.P. Tumulty (Feb. 16, 1918). 
48. See President Seeks Chamberlain’s Aid, Portland Oregonian, July 17, 
1919, at 1 (describing an amicable meeting between Chamberlain and Wilson). 
49. See Burton, supra note 11, at 43–44; Avery, supra note 17, at 92–93. 
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C. Longstanding Political Philosophy 
Yet another conceivable explanation for Wilson’s decision to pro-
voke a constitutional fight over the removal procedure is a deep-seated 
intellectual aversion to mechanisms that weaken presidential power. 
Wilson made his mark as one of the first scholars of American 
government, so perhaps we can find evidence for this hypothesis in his 
writings. Wilson’s most comprehensive work was Congressional Gov-
ernment, which was published in 1885.50 He primarily emphasized the 
dominance of standing committees in the House and Senate but noted 
the institutional weakness of the presidency.51 In that regard, he had a 
few critical words to say about the Tenure of Office Act, which was 
still on the books at the time. He characterized the law as a 
“usurpation” of executive power that is “repugnant . . . to the original 
theory of the Constitution” but went on immediately to discount its 
significance in light of the emergence of the civil service as the primary 
means for filling federal jobs.52 Later he lamented that the statute also 
meant that the chief executive “[could not] dismiss his advisers without 
legislative consent” but quickly added that, in reality, these aides 
served Congress rather than the President and that the entire 
arrangement was “a hopeless undertaking.”53 In a 1900 preface to the 
fifteenth printing, Wilson approvingly noted the repeal of the Tenure 
of Office Act and confessed that he failed to consider that the law had 
“[fallen] into the background” after the Johnson impeachment.54 
Although Wilson plainly disliked the Tenure of Office Act, he 
regarded the law more as a nuisance than as a serious factor in the 
weakness of the presidency. In later years, when he took a more 
optimistic view of the executive and wrote about the prospects for 
effective presidential leadership, Wilson said nothing about the Tenure  
50. See Robert L. Peabody, Afterword to Congressional Government: A 
Study in American Politics 217 (Johns Hopkins paperback ed. 1981) 
(“none of [Wilson’s] books was to rival Congressional Government in 
importance or impact.”). 
51. See generally Niels Aage Thorsen, The Political Thought of 
Woodrow Wilson 41–67 (1988) (describing Wilson’s view of the presi-
dent as “an almost pitiful figure, selected at a nominating convention by 
procedures and for reasons that almost guarantee the nominee’s inability 
to exercise leadership in case of election”); Peabody, supra note 50, at 216 
(noting Wilson’s writings regarding the power struggle between Congress 
and the President); Roland Young, Wilson’s Congressional Government 
Reconsidered, in The Philosophy and Policies of Woodrow Wilson 
201 (Earl Latham ed., 1958) (noting Wilson’s early work criticizing the 
structure of Congress). 
52. Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government 49 (The Riverside 
Press Cambridge 1925) (1885). 
53. Id. at 277. 
54. Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, at vii (15th ed. 1900). 
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of Office Act.55 We should not exaggerate the significance of that 
omission, however, because the offending statute had been repealed two 
decades earlier56 and had no prospects for resuscitation. At most, this 
suggests only that Wilson was not preoccupied by the subject. That in 
turn implies that he did not precipitate a constitutional clash over the 
Myers removal out of a longstanding desire to make a philosophical or 
jurisprudential point. 
One other fact strongly supports this conclusion. Myers was fired 
just short of seven years into Wilson’s presidency.57 That is hardly the 
time to expect him to stamp out a blatantly unconstitutional statute 
that he regarded as substantially undermining his authority. To be sure, 
postmasters were not the highest priority in the grand scheme of 
presidential activity, but the postmaster law covered more than 10,000 
offices, hardly a trivial number.58 Perhaps even more telling, if he really 
objected in principle to the law, Wilson could easily have raised the 
issue at the outset of his first term, when he removed scores of 
postmasters who had been appointed by his Republican predecessors. 
Yet he never did so. Instead, he followed the procedure set out in the 
postmaster statute and sought Senate consent to removals. Indeed, on 
the very day he nominated Frank Myers in 1913, Wilson sought to 
remove another postmaster by submitting the name of a proposed 
successor to the Senate for confirmation.59 
Despite Wilson’s aversion to sharing his removal power with the 
Senate, then, there is no reason to believe that he deliberately provoked 
this fight to vindicate some long-held view of presidential authority. 
D. Frustration with Congress 
An alternative explanation, one that relies less on Wilson’s 
longstanding intellectual commitments and more on his experience in 
office, suggests that he picked a constitutional fight over the Myers 
 
55. See Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United 
States 54–81 (1908) (discussing the presidency). 
56. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
57. See Myers Resignation Demand Letter, supra note 28.  
58. See William Dudley Foulke, Fighting the Spoilsmen 257 (1919); 
Daniel D. Stid, The President as Statesman 137 (1998). By way of 
comparison, there were more than 50,000 fourth-class postmasters. See 
Foulke, supra, at 233. Indeed, the enormous patronage opportunities 
presented by postmasterships was one factor in the Wilson administra-
tion’s reluctance to put these positions under strict civil service proce-
dures. See 4 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and 
Letters 43–50 (1931); Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom 
158–60 (1956); Van Riper, supra note 38, at 238; From the Diary of 
Josephus Daniels (Mar. 7, 1913), 27 The Papers of Woodrow Wilson 
160 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1978). 
59. See 50 Cong. Rec. 199 (1913). 
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removal because he saw many legislative encroachments on his 
prerogatives during his White House years. There is no direct evidence 
for this hypothesis, and Wilson’s physical incapacities during his final 
seventeen months in office suggest a cautious approach to inferring too 
much about his direct involvement in decisionmaking, but the available 
record makes this explanation plausible. 
Wilson’s difficulties with the Senate over the League of Nations and 
the Versailles treaty are well known and need not be rehearsed in detail. 
These difficulties capped a long series of conflicts between the 
administration and Congress, however. Many of the earlier problems 
also related to diplomatic and military matters. For example, soon after 
the First World War began, Wilson proposed that the United States 
purchase merchant vessels of belligerent nations that were marooned in 
American ports due to the war at sea; Congress rejected this measure 
early in 1915 despite vigorous administration lobbying.60 Early the 
following year, Congress seriously considered a resolution to withdraw 
American protection of U.S. citizens traveling on vessels of combatant 
nations; Wilson strenuously opposed this measure, which ultimately 
was rejected, because he thought it undercut his own diplomatic 
efforts.61 
The most significant prewar conflict between Wilson and Congress 
related to his proposal to arm U.S. merchant ships as a last-ditch way 
of defending American neutrality. Following the 1916 election, Wilson 
made this proposal to the lame-duck congressional session.62 The House 
voted in favor, but the measure died in the Senate as the result of a 
filibuster that lasted until noon on March 4, when the Sixty-fourth 
Congress expired.63 Wilson was outraged by this senatorial 
obstreperousness, denouncing the “little group of willful men” who had 
prevented the legislature from functioning.64 He announced that he 
 
60. See Burdette, supra note 40, at 103–15; Arthur S. Link, Wilson: 
The Struggle for Neutrality 81–91 (1960); Ryley, supra note 40, 
at 42–44. 
61. See Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises 167–94 (1964); 
Livermore, supra note 45, at 7; Ryley, supra note 40, at 47–52. 
62. See Burdette, supra note 40, at 115 (“The short session of the 64th 
Congress came to an end on March 4, 1917 . . . With the end of the session 
died the President’s prewar measure to arm merchant vessels, the Armed 
Ship Bill.”). 
63. Ryley, supra note 40, at 92 (“The House passed the Armed Ship Bill on 
the afternoon of March 1.”); Link, supra note 40, at 346–70 (“Republican 
senators met in caucus on that same day and agreed unanimously to 
filibuster against the vital appropriations bill in order to force the 
President to call a special session of Congress soon after the expiration of 
the Sixty-fourth Congress on March 4.”). 
64. See Burdette, supra note 40, at 115–23; Link, supra note 40, at 346–70; 
Ryley, supra note 40, at 94–131. 
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would call the new Sixty-fifth Congress into special session to act on 
the armed-ship bill but insisted that the Senate first take steps to limit 
debate; this resulted in the adoption of a rule providing for cloture.65 In 
the end, Wilson was able to arm the merchant ships without 
congressional action.66 Within weeks, the dispute was superseded by 
events as the nation found itself officially at war. Still, it is clear that 
the armed-ship filibuster left a lasting impression on the chief executive. 
Two other developments support the view that Wilson was becom-
ing increasingly sensitive to presidential prerogative. First, in early 
February 1920, he demanded and received the resignation of Secretary 
of State Robert Lansing for disloyalty.67 It is true that Lansing was 
forced out after Myers was dismissed, but Wilson first learned of 
Lansing’s breach while in Portland to deliver a speech on September 
15, 1919, during his barnstorming tour to rally support for the League 
of Nations.68 Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that the 
ability to remove executive officials had become a matter of some 
salience at that point and that protecting that ability from 
congressional encroachment might well have taken on high priority. 
This possibility receives greater support from Wilson’s veto of the 
Budget and Accounting Act in June 1920 over the procedure for 
removing the Comptroller General. The bill as passed provided that the 
Comptroller could be dismissed, other than by impeachment, only 
through a concurrent resolution of Congress,69 a device that completely 
excludes the President because it is not presented to the chief executive 
for approval or veto. Wilson specifically cited the removal provision as 
the sole basis for rejecting the bill, which dealt with a reform he 
professed to support and which he had endorsed early in his 
administration.70 
 
65. See Sarah A. Binder & Steven S. Smith, Politics or Principle? 
78–79 (1997); Burdette, supra note 40, at 127–28; Link, supra note 40, 
at 370; Ryley, supra note 40, at 147–49. Needless to say, the new Senate 
rule did not eliminate filibusters. See Binder & Smith, supra, at 6–19, 
85–92, 129–53. 
66. See Link, supra note 40, at 372–77; Ryley, supra note 40, at 149–50. 
67. See Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing (Feb. 11, 1920), in 
64 The Papers of Woodrow Wilson 404 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1991); 
Letter from Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson (Feb. 12, 1920), in 64 
The Papers of Woodrow Wilson 408 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1991). 
68. See Clifford W. Trow, “Something Desperate in His Face”: Woodrow 
Wilson in Portland at the “Very Crisis of His Career,” 82 Or. Hist. Q. 
41, 48 (1981). 
69.  59 Cong. Rec. 8609 (1920). 
70. For the veto message, see 59 Cong. Rec. 8609–10 (1920). On the 
background to the bill, see Harvey C. Mansfield, The Comptroller 
General 65–69 (1939); Frederick C. Mosher, The GAO: The Quest 
for Accountability in American Government 43–55 (1979) 
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Although we cannot know for certain, this series of conflicts with 
Congress seems the most likely explanation for the Wilson administra-
tion’s decision to stand on principle in connection with the Myers 
dismissal. No other explanation can adequately account for the White 
House’s refusal to go to the Senate for the removal of an obscure 
postmaster whose ouster almost certainly would have been approved 
on Capitol Hill. 
III. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 
When the Myers case reached the Supreme Court, the government 
argued for a kind of middle ground: Congress could not reserve a formal 
place for itself in the removal process but might set standards governing 
removals by the President.71 Chief Justice Taft rejected this course and 
concluded that the chief executive must have unfettered authority in 
this field.72 It is often suggested that the breadth of the opinion can be 
explained by the uniqueness of Taft’s experience: he was, after all, the 
only person ever to serve both in the White House and on the Supreme 
Court.73 Justice Frankfurter recognized this view in Wiener v. United 
States,74 which read Myers narrowly to find an implicit limitation on 
presidential removal authority for members of the War Claims 
Commission.75  
This superficially attractive explanation is inadequate for several 
reasons. For one thing, Taft had no reason to vindicate Woodrow 
 
[hereinafter Mosher, GAO]; Frederick C. Mosher, A Tale of Two 
Agencies 27–31 (1984) [hereinafter Mosher, Tale]; Darrell Hevenor 
Smith, The General Accounting Office 58–61 (1927); Roger R. 
Trask, Defender of the Public Interest 24–38 (1996). After 
Wilson’s veto was sustained, Congress the following year modified the 
removal procedure to require a joint resolution, which was presented to 
the President, and President Harding signed what became known as the 
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. See Mansfield, supra, at 69–70; 
Mosher, GAO, supra, at 55–56; Mosher, Tale, supra, at 31–32; Smith, 
supra, at 62; Trask, supra, at 38–42. The revised removal provision was 
rejected in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
71. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 96 (argument of Solicitor General 
Beck); Brief for the United States on Reargument, reprinted in S. Doc. 
No. 69-174, supra note 10, at 69–71. 
72. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 106, 176. 
73. See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The President’s Removal Power 
Under the Constitution 50 (1927); William E. Leuchtenburg, The 
Supreme Court Reborn 65 (1995); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power 
and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 Yale L.J. 451, 476 (1979); Peter L. 
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and 
the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 610 (1984). 
74. 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
75. Id. at 351–52. 
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Wilson, the President who fired Myers. After all, Taft had been humil-
iatingly defeated by Wilson when he sought reelection in 1912, carrying 
only two states and finishing third in the popular vote.76 
Moreover, the argument that Taft objected to the postmaster 
statute because he previously served as chief executive ignores his 
behavior as President: Taft sought to remove at least 175 postmasters 
during his White House tenure and never once objected to the statutory 
requirement of senatorial consent.77 It turns out that President Taft 
scrupulously complied with the statute throughout his four years in 
office.78 As far as I have been able to determine, he never objected to 
the requirement of senatorial consent to the removal of postmasters. 
When the Senate failed to act the first time he proposed to dismiss a 
postmaster, Taft routinely resubmitted the name of his preferred 
alternative.79 Nor did Taft protest when the Senate three times refused 
to go along with his proposal to oust John G. Gorth as postmaster of 
Oconomowoc, Wisconsin, and replace him with W.A. Jones.80 
Skepticism about the vulgar realist explanation for Taft’s opinion 
is further warranted by his distaste for deciding postal personnel 
matters. In 1912 he tried to place all fourth-class postmasters under 
civil service.81 Then, in a book he wrote between his presidency and his 
chief justiceship, Taft grumped: 
I cannot exaggerate the waste of the President’s time and the 
consumption of his nervous vitality involved in listening to 
Congressmen’s intercession as to local appointments. Why should 
the President have his time taken up in a discussion over the 
 
76. Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House 525 (1965). 
77. Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form, 
Substance, and Administrative Independence, 75 Ky. L.J. 699, 736 n.166 
(1987). 
78. See, e.g., 48 Cong. Rec. 9239 (1912) (seeking consent to remove and 
replace postmasters in Illinois, Kentucky, and Minnesota); 45 Cong. Rec. 
62 (1909) (seeking consent to remove and replace postmasters in 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and West Virginia). 
79. See, e.g., 48 Cong. Rec. 86 (1911) (resubmitting the name of James S. 
Byrd to be postmaster of Jonesboro, Tennessee, after Senate previously 
adjourned without voting on Byrd’s nomination to replace incumbent 
postmaster Frank E. Britton). 
80. The Senate never voted on the removal of Gorth and his replacement by 
Jones. See 46 Cong. Rec. 73 (1910); 47 Cong. Rec. 54 (1911); 48 Cong. 
Rec. 87 (1911). 
81. See supra note 38. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 4·2015 
The Curious Case of the Pompous Postmaster 
1075 
question of who shall be postmistress at the town of Devil’s Lake 
in North Dakota?82 
He added that all executive branch personnel below the rank of cabinet 
secretaries and a single undersecretary in each department should be 
put under civil service.83 This hardly sounds like a defense of sweeping 
presidential prerogative. 
In fact, Taft had a more complex view of the office. Although he 
did not believe in an activist chief executive, he wanted to protect 
presidential prerogatives in those areas. Moreover, this was not a view 
that he came to only after serving in the White House. Thirty-five years 
before Myers and nearly two decades before his election as President, 
Taft argued for an expansive view of the removal power. As Solicitor 
General in 1891, Taft defended President Cleveland’s removal of an 
Alaska territorial official.84 In the same year, he advised the Treasury 
Department that it had broad power to dismiss a politically disloyal 
customs officer.85 
Ironically, it appears that it was Taft rather than Wilson who had 
a longstanding aversion to limitations on presidential removal author-
ity. When the opportunity finally arose, Taft seems to have seized it to 
write his broad view into constitutional doctrine. 
IV. MYERS AS PRECEDENT AND AS SYMBOL 
Initially Myers was thought to have made clear that the President 
has unfettered power to remove all nonjudicial civilian appointed 
officials. This view was reflected in two different ways during the years 
immediately following that ruling. First, the statutes creating the 
Federal Power Commission in 193086 and both the Federal 
Communications Commission87 and the Securities and Exchange 
 
82. William Howard Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers 
67 (1916). 
83. See id. at 70–71. 
84. See McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174 (1891). Ironically, a major 
part of Taft’s argument was that the removal fell within an exception to 
the Tenure of Office Act, which was still in force when the official was 
ousted. See id. at 177–78. 
85. See Alpheus Thomas Mason, William Howard Taft: Chief Justice 
254 (1965) (quoting Letter from William Howard Taft to A.L. Spaulding 
(July 23, 1891)). 
86. Act of June 23, 1930, ch. 572, 46 Stat. 797 (amended by Department of 
Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 401, 91 Stat. 565, 582–83 
(reorganizing and renaming the agency as the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission)). 
87. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 4, 48 Stat. 1064, 1066–68 (codified 
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 154 (2012)). 
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Commission in 193488 were silent with respect to removal, thereby 
reflecting the view that Myers had resolved the removal issue in favor 
of the President.89  
Second, Solicitor General Stanley Reed, having been advised to 
select a sure winner as the first case he would present in the Supreme 
Court, chose the seemingly safe argument that the statutory require-
ment that the President could remove a member of the Federal Trade 
Commission only for cause was unconstitutional on the basis of Myers.90 
Reed’s approach seemed reasonable, as Myers had been decided only 
nine years earlier, but it proved to be a colossal miscalculation: the 
Court unanimously upheld the for-cause provision in Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States.91 The Court reasoned that the FTC was an 
independent agency and that Myers applied only to “purely executive” 
offices.92 
The retreat from the broadest implications of Myers continued two 
decades later in Wiener v. United States,93 which relied on Humphrey’s 
Executor to read a for-cause requirement into the statute that created 
the War Claims Commission.94 A unanimous Court explained that 
officials who were charged with deciding claims “‘according to law’” 95 
could not function with “the Damocles’ sword of removal by the 
President” hanging over them.96 
Although Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener limited the broadest 
language in Myers, that ruling has retained its vitality at least to the 
extent that the Supreme Court continues to reaffirm that Congress 
itself may not formally participate in the removal of officials exercising 
executive power. Notably, in Bowsher v. Synar,97 the Court invalidated 
a provision of a statute that authorized the Comptroller General to 
 
88. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 4, 48 Stat. 881, 885 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012)). 
89. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 546–47 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the result of the 
Myers decision was to “cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of all 
‘for cause’ removal provisions”). The Court decided Free Enterprise Fund 
on the “understanding,” based on the parties’ agreement, that members 
of the SEC were removable only for cause. Id. at 487 (opinion of the Court). 
90. Leuchtenburg, supra note 73, at 64. 
91. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
92. Id. at 627–28. 
93. 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
94. Id. at 353–54. 
95. Id. at 355 (quoting War Claims Act of 1948, ch. 826, § 3, 62 Stat 1240, 
1241 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 2002 (2012)). 
96. Id. at 356. 
97. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
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issue sequestration orders to reduce federal spending if the budget 
deficit exceeded specified limits. The Court reasoned that Congress 
could unilaterally dismiss the Comptroller General because that official 
could be removed by a joint resolution—which meant both that only 
Congress could initiate removal and that the legislative branch could 
oust the Comptroller over the President’s objection by overriding the 
chief executive’s veto of a joint resolution.98 This arrangement rendered 
the Comptroller “subservient to Congress”99 and precluded him from 
exercising any aspect of executive power.100 Even as it reaffirmed that 
Congress could not formally participate in the process of removal, 
however, the Bowsher Court explicitly declined to endorse the most 
sweeping view of presidential power. The opinion contained a footnote 
that disclaimed any suggestion that the ruling called into doubt the 
constitutionality of independent agencies such as the Federal Trade 
Commission, which had been at the heart of the dispute in Humphrey’s 
Executor.101 
Moreover, Myers was the focal point of the argument in Morrison 
v. Olson,102 which upheld the independent counsel provisions of the 
Ethics in Government Act103 against a challenge based in large part on 
the statutory procedure for removing special prosecutors. Under the 
Ethics in Government Act, the Attorney General was required to 
conduct a preliminary investigation of information suggesting that 
high-level executive officials had violated federal criminal laws. That 
investigation could last no more than ninety days. If, at the end of this 
period, the Attorney General found no reasonable grounds to believe 
that a crime had been committed, the matter ended. Otherwise, the 
Attorney General was required to refer the matter to a special court 
that would appoint an independent counsel who could be removed only 
by the Attorney General and only for good cause.104 
The Court rejected the challenge to the removal procedure. 
Reaffirming the Bowsher interpretation of Myers, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist explained that the independent counsel law did not entail a 
 
98. Id. at 728 & n.7. 
99. Id. at 730.  
100. Id. at 732. The Court had no difficulty in concluding that the functions 
assigned to the Comptroller General under the statute were executive in 
nature. Id. at 733. 
101. Id. at 725 n.4 (observing that no statute gives Congress a formal role in 
the removal of members of independent agencies). 
102. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
103. Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867–75 (1978) (amended 1983, 
1987, and 1994; expired 1999). 
104. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660–65 (discussing the procedural steps 
required by the Act). 
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legislative effort to participate in the removal process: the Ethics Act 
“puts the removal power squarely in the hands of the Executive 
Branch”;105 only the Attorney General, an executive officer who is 
directly accountable to the President, could remove an independent 
counsel. Accordingly, the arrangement was analogous to that in 
Humphrey’s Executor and therefore quite different from those in Myers 
or in Bowsher, where Congress itself had a formal role in the removal 
of an official who exercised executive power.106 Moreover, the Court 
declined to focus on whether the independent counsel was a “purely 
executive” officer, expressing its “present considered view”107 that the 
removal arrangements did not “unduly trammel[] on executive 
authority.”108 
This analysis provoked an apoplectic dissent from Justice Scalia, 
who lamented the demise of what he called “our former constitutional 
system.”109 Explicitly reaffirming Myers110 while criticizing Humphrey’s 
Executor,111 Scalia specifically invoked the Watergate special prosecutor 
to illustrate what he viewed as an acceptable political response to 
allegations of executive wrongdoing.112 A closer look at the institutional 
arrangements relating to the Watergate special prosecutor in the Nixon 
tapes case suggests that Justice Scalia’s invocation of those 
arrangements as preferable to those in the independent counsel law 
might have overlooked an important feature that was never mentioned 
by either the parties or the Court in United States v. Nixon.113 
By way of background, Leon Jaworski, who litigated the tapes case, 
was the second Watergate special prosecutor. The first special 
prosecutor, Archibald Cox, was dismissed on orders of President Nixon. 
The gravity of the situation was reflected in the resignations on 
principle of Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney 
General William Ruckelshaus, both of whom refused direct orders to 
fire Cox. Faced with what his own aides described as a “firestorm” of 
criticism that badly undermined his credibility following what became 
 
105. Id. at 686. 
106. Id. (drawing an analogy to Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and 
distinguishing Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714, and Myers v. United States, 277 
U.S. 52 (1926)). 
107. Id. at 689. 
108. Id. at 691. 
109. Id. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
110. Id. at 723. 
111. Id. at 725–26. 
112. Id. at 711. 
113. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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known as the Saturday Night Massacre,114 Nixon had to acquiesce in 
the appointment of Jaworski as the new special prosecutor. Whatever 
we might think about the arrangements for removing an independent 
counsel under the Ethics Act, the procedure for removing the 
Watergate special prosecutor should have raised constitutional alarms 
to anyone who took Myers—even as it had been qualified in Humphrey’s 
Executor and Wiener—seriously as a precedent. 
As noted above, an independent counsel could be removed only by 
the Attorney General—not by the President—and only for cause. The 
Watergate special prosecutor, on the other hand, could be removed by 
the President—but only for “extraordinary improprieties” and even 
then only after the chief executive’s “first consulting the Majority and 
the Minority Leaders and Chairmen and ranking Minority Members of 
the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives 
and ascertaining that their consensus is in accord with [the President’s] 
proposed action.”115 The Supreme Court quoted this regulation in a 
footnote in Nixon but attached no substantive significance to the 
removal mechanism.116 
In other words, the President had to obtain the effective approval 
of congressional leaders before removing Jaworski as Watergate special 
prosecutor. This was precisely the vice that led the Court to invalidate 
the procedure for removing postmasters in Myers. If anything, the 
problem in the Watergate case was more egregious, because only a 
handful of legislators rather than one or both houses of Congress had 
to consent to the dismissal of the special prosecutor. 
Perhaps this provision was overlooked because President Nixon’s 
lawyers did not attack the requirement of congressional approval of the 
removal of the special prosecutor. It is not as though Nixon’s lawyers 
ignored Myers. Their brief on the merits invoked that precedent as 
exemplifying the centrality of separation of powers and supporting the 
notion that the President is immune from compulsory process.117 The 
brief went on to mention, almost in passing, that “the specific holding 
of the Myers case was narrowed to some extent” in a subsequent case, 
although “that narrowing was on a point that does not bear on the 
present issue.”118 
From a contemporary perspective, this seems like a legal gaffe. 
After all, Myers held that requiring Senate consent for the removal of  
114. Elizabeth Drew, Washington Journal: The Events of 1973–1974, 
at 66 (1975); see also Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: 
The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon 411 (1990). 
115. 38 Fed. Reg. 30738, 30739 (1973). 
116. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 694–95 n.8. 
117. Brief. for the Respondent and Cross-Petitioner Richard M. Nixon, 
President of the United States, at 73, Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
118. Id. at 74 (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)) 
(emphasis added). 
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a postmaster unconstitutionally impinged on presidential power. The 
subsequent case to which Nixon’s brief referred was Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States. But the regulation requiring the President 
to consult with and obtain consensus approval from the leadership of 
both houses of Congress before discharging the Watergate special 
prosecutor goes well beyond the cause requirement upheld in 
Humphrey’s Executor and might pose even greater constitutional prob-
lems than the postmaster provision that Myers rejected. In Myers the 
full Senate had to act, whereas the Watergate regulation empowered a 
handful of influential Senators and Representatives to prevent the 
President from discharging the special prosecutor. 
I do not raise this example to fault anyone: the Supreme Court, 
President Nixon and his able lawyers, or Justice Scalia. Maybe the 
details about removing the special prosecutor got lost in the way that 
Myers was perceived. The strong theory of the unitary executive did 
not emerge with full force until the presidency of Ronald Reagan, 
almost a decade after Nixon’s resignation.119 The notion of an unfettered 
removal power in the President is a central facet of the unitary 
executive theory.120 At the same time, some proponents of a strong 
presidency have not relied on the removal power to support their 
position and count themselves as skeptical of the unitary executive 
theory.121 Whatever the explanation, the Watergate tapes case should 
remind us about the variability and ultimate contingency of many legal 
concepts. 
* * * 
Myers was a most curious case. A minor personnel flap became the 
vehicle for a constitutional collision whose ramifications are still being 
fought over. That the case was unnecessary does not detract from its 
significance. Frank Myers could have been fired according to the  
119. See generally J. David Alvis, Jeremy D. Bailey & F. Flagg Taylor 
IV, The Contested Removal Power, 1789–2010, 186–89 (2013) 
(explaining how the Reagan administration utilized the theory of the 
unitary executive). 
120. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 
F.3d 667, 692–704 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), rev’d, 
561 U.S. 477 (2010); In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 496–504 (D.C. Cir.), 
rev’d sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Stephen G. 
Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: 
Presidential Power from Washington to Bush (2008); Stephen G. 
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994); David P. Currie, The Distribution of 
Powers After Bowsher, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 19, 31–36; Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41. 
121. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 
2245 (2001); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the 
Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1994). 
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statutory procedures, and the legal question could have been avoided 
for another day. Woodrow Wilson had more important problems on his 
agenda in 1920, and William Howard Taft need not have tried to resolve 
the removal debate so definitively in 1926. But to say that the 
principals could have behaved differently simply suggests that 
Bismarck’s observation about legislation and sausage applies to 
litigation as well. 
Two last points might be worth noting. The first is ironic and 
concerns one of the case’s participants. Frank Myers was represented 
throughout the litigation by Will R. King, a longtime leader of the 
progressive faction of the Oregon Democratic Party who, like Myers, 
opposed the Chamberlain wing of the party.122 King went on to serve 
on the Oregon Supreme Court. When he died in 1934, the newspaper 
obituaries contained not a word about his role in the great Myers 
case.123 
Finally, it is apparent that the Supreme Court has not taken Chief 
Justice Taft’s sweeping opinion in Myers at face value. The stakes of 
the removal debate are far from clear, because Presidents rarely exercise 
whatever removal authority they might have. The arguments here 
really are proxies for larger disagreements concerning presidential 
authority to oversee and direct the administration and implementation 
of policy. In the end, Myers is important despite its oddities because of 
the care and attention that the parties and the Court devoted to the 
larger questions that the case raised. 
 
 
122. See Burton, supra note 11, at 41. 
123. See Will R. King, Ex-Justice of Oregon, Dead, Oregon J., June 3, 1934, 
§ 1, at 2; William R. King Dead, Portland Oregonian, June 3, 1934, 
§ 1, at 4. 
